• By Captain Umar Farooq (Retd.)

Pakistan has endured militant violence at the hands of the Taliban and the Baluchistan Liberation Army (BLA) for many years. Repeated attacks on military installations, police check posts, and civilian populations are not a new phenomenon — but their persistence signals something deeply troubling: a systemic gap in our intelligence-gathering apparatus.

Law enforcement agencies have responded with force, and often with commendable courage. But reactive operations alone are insufficient. The fact that militant groups continue to conduct coordinated strikes — evidently following prior reconnaissance of their targets — suggests that our agencies are either unaware of their movements or unable to act on that awareness in time. This is, in plain terms, an intelligence failure.

  • The Core Problem: Reactive Instead of Preemptive

A preemptive approach requires actionable intelligence — knowledge of where militants hide, how they communicate, who funds them, and where their next strike is planned. Currently, our intelligence cycle appears to be generating information too slowly or too narrowly to disrupt operations before they occur. Bridging this gap is the most urgent national security task Pakistan faces today.

  • Key Recommendations
  1. Map and Monitor Militant Hideouts

Concentration areas, safe houses, and training camps of militant groups must be identified. Once located, satellite surveillance, human intelligence, and digital monitoring must be continuously maintained on these sites.

  1. Intercept Militant Communications

The conversations of suspected militants must be tapped by relevant agencies. Any high-risk intentions detected must be acted upon swiftly before they translate into attacks.

  1. Recruit and Embed Informants

A robust informant network, embedded within or adjacent to militant circles, remains one of the most reliable sources of granular operational intelligence. Agencies must invest seriously in this area.

  1. Seal Illegal Border Crossings

Illegal crossings from Afghan, Indian, and Iranian borders must be monitored and stopped. Civilian intelligence assets should be deployed at these crossing points to filter the infiltration of militants into Pakistani territory.

  1. Choke the Illegal Weapons Supply

Most arms and explosives reaching militants come through local dealers. Rigorous checks and strict accountability must be imposed on arms dealers across the country, particularly in KPK and Baluchistan.

  1. Train Officers in Militant Behaviour Recognition

Army and civilian officers posted at KPK and Baluchistan borders must undergo specialised training to identify the behavioural patterns and profiles typical of Taliban and BLA operatives.

  1. Acquire Advanced Surveillance Technology

Pakistan should seek cutting-edge spying and signals intelligence technology, including through cooperation with China and other strategic partners. Modern counter-insurgency cannot be fought without a technological edge.

  1. Engage the Public

Awareness campaigns must be launched encouraging ordinary citizens to report abnormal behaviour to the relevant agencies. Public vigilance is one of the most cost-effective intelligence tools available to any state.

  1. Regulate Social Media and Media Platforms

Intelligence agencies must shut down social media accounts and websites that promote militancy and terrorism. PEMRA should enforce stricter guidelines on print and electronic media to promote national loyalty and actively counter extremist narratives.

  1. Establish a Dedicated Civilian Intelligence Agency

Beyond ISI, IB, and FIA, there is a strong case for creating a new civilian agency focused exclusively on countering domestic militancy, with sharper focus and more agile methods than existing bodies allow.

  1. Study the Sri Lanka Model

Sri Lanka’s military victory over the Tamil Tigers offers a compelling case study for Pakistani officers. A combination of intelligence superiority, political will, and coordinated military pressure ultimately dismantled an entrenched insurgency. This experience deserves serious study.

  1. Identify and Act on Sympathisers

Officers and public representatives who display sympathy toward militant groups must be identified and dealt with firmly. Complicity, whether active or passive, cannot be tolerated at any level of the state.

  1. Assess Foreign Proxy Involvement

Pakistani agencies must develop a clear, evidence-based understanding of how hostile foreign actors — including through Indian and Israeli proxies — contribute to internal destabilisation, and respond to those threats proportionately.

  1. Launch Rehabilitation Programmes

The government must establish credible rehabilitation programmes offering militants genuine pathways back into civilian life. Combining hard security measures with meaningful off-ramps is proven counter-insurgency doctrine.

  1. Invest in Neglected Regions

Development projects in tribal districts, Bannu, Lakki Marwat, and underserved areas of Baluchistan can reduce the alienation and hopelessness that militant recruiters exploit. Where there is no hope, there is a recruit.

  1. Expose Indoctrination Networks

Those responsible for radicalising youth in KPK and Baluchistan must be identified and held accountable. The networks behind this process must be dismantled.

  1. Announce Head-Money for Militant Leaders

Confirmed militant leaders should have substantial rewards placed on their heads. This incentivises local tip-offs and fractures internal trust within militant organisations.

  • Conclusion

Pakistan’s intelligence community is capable of far more than current outcomes suggest. Closing the intelligence gap requires political will, structural reform, technological investment, and genuine community engagement. The threat from the Taliban and BLA is real and evolving. Our response must be equally dynamic. A safer and more prosperous Pakistan is not a distant dream — it is a strategic objective that intelligent, coordinated action can achieve.

  • Captain Umar Farooq (Retd.) is a security analyst and former military officer.

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